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Abstract: This paper studies mean field games for multi-agent systems with control-dependent multiplicative
noises. For the general systems with nonuniform agents, we obtain a set of decentralized strategies by solving an
auxiliary limiting optimal control problem subject to consistent mean field approximations. The set of decentral-
ized strategies is further shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. For the integrator multiagent systems, we design a set
of ε-Nash strategies by exploiting the convexity property of the limiting problem. It is shown that under the mild
conditions all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
Key words: mean field game; multiplicative noise; distributed strategy; mean-square consensus
1 Introduction
The methodology of mean field games was proposed to investigate decentralized strategies in large population
dynamic games [11], [12], [13], [16]; it is effective to design asymptotic Nash equilibria for many players which
are individually negligible but collectively affect a particular player. By identifying a consistency relationship
between the individual’s optimal response and the population macroscopic behavior, one may obtain a fixed-point
equation to specify the mean field effect. This procedure leads to a set of decentralized strategies as an ε-Nash
equilibrium for the actual model with large population. For some aspects of mean field games, the readers are
referred to the linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) framework [11], [12], [30], [24], [34], mean field games with a
major player [2], [10], [33], [36], the nonlinear mean field games [4], [13], oblivious equilibria for large-scale
Markov decision processes [38], and mean field games with Markov jump parameters [34], [35]. For the survey
on mean field games, see, e.g., [2], [7], and [3].
Concerned with mean field games for stochastic systems, most existing literature focuses on the case with
additive noise, namely, the intensity of noise is independent of the system state. Sometimes, such kind of noises
is not sufficient to model the practical situations. Alternatively, multiplicative noise is another realistic description
for uncertainty; in this case, the noise intensity depends on the system state. Stochastic systems with multiplicative
noises have been extensively studied in the past half century in the control and mathematical communities. From
the viewpoint of mathematics, almost all the theories about stochastic differential equations (SDEs, for short) are
for the case with multiplicative noises, and there are lots of practical motivations to study such kinds of SDEs
[27]. The study in control community is also popular; to mention a few, see monographs [6], [39] and some recent
papers on stochastic control [40], [41].
In particular, some researchers have paid attention to multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises, that is,
the intensity of noise depends on agents’ states. Multiplicative noises in multi-agent systems can be generated
by data transmission channels, during the propagation of radio signals or under signal processing by receivers
or detectors [37]. In [23], the authors investigated the consensus problems for the continuous-time systems with
∗This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61773241, 61773222, 61573221 and
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multiplicative noises and the noise intensities are proportional to the absolute value of the relative states of agents
and their neighbors. Then this work was extended to the discrete-time version in [21]. Further, the work [19]
studied the distributed consensus with the general multiplicative noises and developed some small consensus gain
theorems to give sufficient conditions for mean square and almost sure consensus under undirected topologies.
Moreover, the authors in [42] investigated stochastic consentability of linear multi-agent systems with time delays
and multiplicative noises; and [43] developed the consensus conditions of continuous-time multi-agent systems
with additive and multiplicative measurement noises. Note that the methodology of handling the multiplicative
noises of multi-agent systems is different from the stochastic-approximation-type algorithms [14], [18], [32], which
are powerful tools to deal with multi-agent systems with additive noisy measurements.
Due to its wide popularity and practical applications [5, 8, 15], multiplicative noise should be taken care of
when considering mean field games, which is the theme of this paper. An LQ mean field game with multiplicative
noises is introduced in Section 2, where the diffusion terms include both the state and the control variables. Due to
the appearance of multiplicative noise, the strategy design and analysis of this LQ mean field game is not a trivial
extension of those with additive noises [40], [20]. For instance, a stochastic linear system with additive noise
cannot attain asymptotic stability (in the normal sense), while a stochastic system with multiplicative noise could
be asymptotically stable. Furthermore, the optimal control law for a stochastic system with additive noise and a
quadratic cost is no longer optimal for the case with multiplicative noise. Indeed, research on stochastic systems
with additive noise shares similar methods and results to deterministic systems. In contrast, it is more complicate
to study stochastic control with multiplicative noise, particularly with control-dependent noise (e.g., stochastic
maximum principle) [39]. In Section 3, we start by solving an auxiliary limiting optimal control problem and
next construct an equation system of mean field effect by the consistent mean field approximation. For the case
of the uniform agents, the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the solution to the consistency equations
are obtained. With the help of the mean field effect and the solution to the limiting problem, we design a set of
decentralized strategies, which is further shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4, we investigate single- and multiple- integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises.
The dynamics of each agent is a integrator system with control-dependent multiplicative noise, and the control
weight in the cost function is not limited to be positive. By exploiting the coercivity property of the limiting
problem, the proposed strategies is proved to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. Particularly, we give the explicit conditions
to ensure all the agents achieve mean-square consensus. The closely related works [25], [26] investigated the
consensus problem for single-integrator systems with additive noises from the optimization principle, and under
the proposed strategies the mean of agents’ states asymptotically achieve consensus, whereas the own states of
agents can not attach consensus. In Section 5, we give a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the
proposed consensus strategies for single-integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. Furthermore,
we compare the consensus effect between this model and multi-agent systems with additive noises. It is shown that
agents with multiplicative noises can reach consensus, while agents with additive noises do not achieve consensus
exactly. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Compared with previous works, the main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows: (i) We study
mean field games with control-dependent multiplicative noises and obtain decentralized ε-Nash strategies. Differ-
ent from the case with additive noise, we adopt the Lyapunov function method to show the uniform stability of
closed-loop system, and then obtain the asymptotic equilibrium property of decentralized strategies. (ii) For the
case with uniform agents, we give an easy-verified condition to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution
to consistency equations. (iii) We further investigate (single- and multiple-) integrator multi-agent systems with
multiplicative noises, where the control weight in the cost is not limited to be positive. By exploiting the convexity
and coercivity properties of the limiting problem, it is shown that the set of decentralized strategies is an ε-Nash
equilibrium and all the agents of closed-loop system converge to a constant, which is the limit of the initial state
average of all agents as N→ ∞.
The following notation will be used throughout this paper. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm or Peron-
Frobenious matrix norm. For a vector z and a matrix Q, ‖z‖2Q = zT Qz, and Q > 0 (or Q ≥ 0) means that Q is
positive definite (or semi-positive definite). C([0,∞),Rn) is the space of all the n-dimensional continuous func-
tions on [0,∞), and Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is a subspace of C([0,∞),Rn) which is given by { f |
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρt‖ f (t)‖2dt < ∞}.
2
For a family of Rn-valued random variables {x(λ ),λ ≥ 0}, σ(x(λ ),λ ≤ t) is the σ -algebra generated by the
collection of random variables. For two sequences {an,n = 0,1, · · ·} and {bn,n = 0,1, · · ·}, an = O(bn) denotes
limsupn→∞ |an/bn| ≤ c, and an = o(bn) denotes limsupn→∞ |an/bn| = 0. For convenience of presentation, we use
c,c1,c2, · · · to denote generic positive constants, which may vary from place to place.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a large population system with N agents. For i= 1, ...,N, agent i evolves according to the following SDE:
dxi(t) = [A(θi)xi(t)+Bui(t)]dt+[Cxi(t)+Dui(t)]dWi(t), (2.1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rr are the state and input. The underlying filtered probability space is (Ω,{Ft}t≥0,P),
where {Ft}t≥0 is a collection of non-decreasing σ -algebras. Wi = {Wi(t), t ≥ 0} is a 1-dimensional standard
Brownian motion, which is adapted to {Ft}t≥0, and Wi, i = 1, ...,N, are assumed to be mutually independent. The
matrices A(·),B,C and D are deterministic and have compatible dimensions. Here, the parameters θi,1 ≤ i ≤ N,
are to model this population of nonuniform agents. For notational simplicity, the time argument of a process (xi,ui,
etc.) is sometimes suppressed, and A(θi) is denoted as Ai or Aθi .
The cost function of agent i is given by
Ji(ui,u−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− x(N)(t)∥∥2Q+‖ui(t)‖2R}dt, (2.2)
where ρ ≥ 0, and Q,R are symmetric matrices with compatible dimensions. x(N)(t) = 1N ∑Nj=1 x j(t), and u−i =
{u1, . . . ,ui−1,ui+1, . . . ,uN}. The admissible control set of agent i is given by
Ui =
{
ui
∣∣ui(t) ∈F it , E∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt < ∞
}
,
where F it = σ(xi(s),s ≤ t), i = 1, · · · ,N. Denote Ud , U1×·· ·×UN . For comparison to Ud , we introduce the
centralized admissible control set:
Uc =
{
ui| ui(t) ∈ σ(
N⋃
i=1
F it ),E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt < ∞
}
.
In this paper, we will study the following problem.
Problem (P). Seek a set of control strategies withinUd that minimize Ji(ui,u−i), i= 1, ...,N in a game-theoretic
setting. Specifically, find an ε-Nash equilibrium in the decentralized control set Ud , where ε → 0 as N→ ∞.
For a large population, a natural way of modeling parameters θ1, · · · ,θN is to view them as a sequence of obser-
vations on the same underlying distribution function such that this sequence exhibits certain statistical properties
when N→∞. For this, assume that θ1, · · · ,θN are valued in a compact set Θ ∈Rd . Define the associated empirical
distribution function FN(θ) = 1N ∑
N
i=1 I[θi≤θ ], where I[θi≤θ ] = 1 if θi ≤ θ and I[θi≤θ ] = 0 otherwise.
We make the following assumptions:
A1) xi(0), i= 1, ...,N, are mutually independent and have the same mathematical expectation. Exi(0)≡ x¯0, and
there exists a constant c0 (independent of N) such that max1≤i≤NE‖xi(0)‖2 < c0. Furthermore, {xi(0), i = 1, ...,N}
and {Wi, i = 1, ...,N} are independent of each other.
A2) A(θ) is a continuous matrix function of θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is a compact subset of Rd . There exists a
distribution function F(·) such that FN converges weakly to F , i.e., for any bounded continuous function ψ(θ) on
Θ, limN→∞
∫
Θψ(θ)dFN(θ) =
∫
Θψ(θ)dF(θ).
A3) For any i ∈ {1, ...,N}, the system (2.1) is ρ-stabilizable1 in the sense that there exists a feedback control
1A similar definition is ρ-stability. A system
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+Cx(t)dW (t)
is said to be ρ-stable (or [A,C] is ρ-stable, for short) if E
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρt‖x(t)‖2dt < ∞. See [41] for further results about ρ-stability and ρ-
stabilizability.
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law ui = Kixi such that for any initial state xi(0) ∈ Rn, the state of closed-loop system
dxi(t) = (Ai+BKi)xi(t)dt+(C+DKi)xi(t)dWi(t)
satisfies
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt < ∞.
A4) R > 0, Q≥ 0. The system dzi(t) =(Ai−
ρ
2
I)zi(t)dt+Czi(t)dWi(t),
yi(t) =
√
Qzi(t)
(or simply [Ai − ρ2 I,C,
√
Q]) is exactly detectable, namely, if yi(t) = 0,a.s., t ∈ [0,T ],∀T > 0 implies
limt→∞E‖zi(t)‖2→ 0.
Remark 2.1. Assumption A3) is necessary. Otherwise, the cost function cannot be finite, to say nothing of the
optimal control. A4) could be relaxed. Actually, provided some convexity condition is satisfied, neither R nor Q is
limited to be positive definite. For instance, R is allowed to be negative in Section 4. In [31], Q=
[
0 −0.5
−0.5 0
]
is not semi-positive definite.
Remark 2.2. By [28, Theorem 1] The system (2.1) is ρ-stabilizable if and only if there exists a matrix K and
a positive definite matrix Xi such that
ρXi = (Ai+BK)T Xi+Xi(Ai+BK)+(C+DK)T Xi(C+DK)< 0.
By [41, Theorem 3.1], the system (2.1) is exactly detectable if and only if there does not exist nonzero symmetric
matrix Z such that
AZ+ZAT +CZCT = λZ, QZ = 0, Reλ ≥ 0.
See more equivalent conditions in verifying ρ-stabilizability and exact detectability in [28, 41].
3 Strategy Design and Analysis
3.1 Optimal control for the limiting problem
Assume that x¯(·) ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is given for approximation of x(N)(·). Replacing x(N)(·) in (2.2) by x¯(·), we
have a standard optimal tracking problem.
Problem (P1). For i = 1, ...,N, find u¯i ∈Ui such that
J¯i(u¯i) = min
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui)
holds, where J¯i(ui) is given by
J¯i(ui) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2Q+‖ui(t)‖2R}dt.
For a general initial state xi(t) = xi ∈ Rn, define the value function
Vi(t,xi) = inf
ui∈Ui
E
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
{∥∥xi(τ)− x¯(τ)∥∥2Q+∥∥ui(τ)∥∥2R}dτ∣∣∣xi(t) = xi] .
We introduce the HJB equation:
ρVi(t,xi) = inf
ui∈Rr
{∂Vi(t,xi)
∂ t
+
∂V Ti (t,xi)
∂xi
(Aixi+Bui)+
1
2
(Cxi+Dui)T
∂ 2Vi(t,xi)
∂x2i
(Cxi+Dui)
4
+‖xi− x¯(t)‖2Q+‖ui‖2R
}
. (3.1)
Letting Vi(t,xi) = xTi Pixi+2s
T
i (t)xi+gi(t), then the optimal control is given by
u¯i =− 12 (R+D
T PiD)−1
[
BT
∂Vi
∂xi
+DT
∂ 2Vi
∂x2i
Cxi
]
=− (R+DT PiD)−1[(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi+BT si]. (3.2)
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1), we have
ρ(xTi Pixi+2s
T
i xi+gi) = x
T
i [A
T
i Pi+PiAi+C
T PiC+Q− (BT Pi+DT PiC)T (R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC)]xi
+2
[
dsi
dt
+[Ai−B(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC)]T si−Qx¯
]
xi
+
dgi
dt
− sTi B(R+DT PiD)−1BT si+ x¯T Qx¯.
This yields
ρPi =ATi Pi+PiAi+C
T PiC+Q− (BT Pi+DT PiC)T (R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC), (3.3)
ρsi =
dsi
dt
+[Ai−B(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC)]T si−Qx¯, (3.4)
ρgi =
dgi
dt
− sTi B(R+DT PiD)−1BT si+ x¯T Qx¯. (3.5)
Here, si(0) and gi(0) are not pre-specified and to be determined by si ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) and gi ∈Cρ([0,∞),Rn),
respectively.
We now provide a preliminary result for LQ control with multiplicative noise.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that A1)-A4) hold and x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is given. For Problem (P1), the following
statements hold.
i) The algebraic Riccati equation (3.3) admits a unique semi-positive definite solution, and the closed-loop
system
dxi(t) = A¯ixi(t)dt+C¯xi(t)dWi(t) (3.6)
or [A¯i,C¯] is ρ-stable, where A¯i
∆
= Ai−B(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi +DT PiC) and C¯ ∆= C−D(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi +
DT PiC), 1≤ i≤ N.
ii) The equation (3.4) admits a unique solution si ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn), and (3.5) admits a unique solution gi ∈
Cρ([0,∞),R).
iii) Problem (P1) admits a unique optimal control
u¯i(t) =−(R+DT PiD)−1[(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi(t)+BT si(t)], t ≥ 0. (3.7)
and the optimal cost is given by
inf
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui) = E[xTi (0)Pixi(0)]+2sTi (0)x¯0+gi(0).
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
3.2 Design of control strategies
Following the standard approach in mean field games [12], [17], we construct the consistency equations
ρsθ (t) =
dsθ
dt
+ A¯Tθ sθ (t)−Qx¯(t), (3.8)
dx¯θ
dt
=A¯θ x¯θ (t)−B(R+DT PθD)−1BT sθ (t), (3.9)
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x¯(t) =
∫
Θ
x¯θ (t)dF(θ) (3.10)
where A¯θ = Aθ −B(R+DT PθD)−1(BT Pθ +DT PθC), x¯θ (0) = x¯0, and sθ (0) is to be determined. In the above, x¯θ
is regarded as the expectation of the state given the parameter θ in the individual dynamics. The last equation is
due to the consistency requirement for the mean field approximation.
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to (3.8)-(3.10) may be obtained by using fixed-point methods similar
to those in [12] and [34]. For further analysis, we make the following assumption.
A5) There exists a solution x¯ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) to (3.8)-(3.10).
For a population-size system in Problem (P), we may design the control strategy as follows:
uˆi(t) =−(R+DT PiD)−1[(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi(t)+BT si(t)], t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,N, (3.11)
where si is the solution of equation system (3.8)-(3.10).
3.3 The case with uniform agents
In what follows, we consider the consistency equations for the case with uniform agents, namely, A(θi) ≡ A in
(2.1) is independent of θi, i = 1, · · · ,N. In this case, the equations (3.8)-(3.10) read as
ρs(t) =
ds
dt
+ A¯T s(t)−Qx¯(t), (3.12)
dx¯
dt
=A¯x¯(t)−B(R+DT PD)−1BT s(t), (3.13)
where A¯=A−B(R+DT PD)−1(BT P+DT PC). Denote
M =
[
A¯− ρ2 I B(R+DT PD)−1BT
−Q −A¯T + ρ2 I
]
.
We now give an easy-verified condition to guarantee A5).
Theorem 3.2. Let A3) and A4) hold. If the real part of any eigenvalue of M is not zero (no eigenvalue of M is
on the imaginary axis), then (3.12)-(3.13) have a unique solution (s, x¯) ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),R2n).
Proof. Letting s(t) = Kx¯(t)+ϕ(t), t ≥ 0, from (3.13) and (3.12) we have
ds
dt
=K
dx¯
dt
+
dϕ
dt
=K[A¯x¯−B(R+DT PD)−1BT (Kx¯+ϕ)]+ dϕ
dt
=(ρI− A¯T )(Kx¯+ϕ)+Qx¯,
which implies
K(A¯− ρ
2
I)+(A¯− ρ
2
I)T K−KB(R+DT PD)−1BT K−Q = 0, (3.14)
dϕ
dt
+
[
A¯−ρI−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K]Tϕ = 0. (3.15)
From Lemma 3.1, A¯i− ρ2 I is Hurwitz. Since no eigenvalue of M is on the imaginary axis, then by [22] we have
that (3.14) admits a unique solution such that A¯− ρ2 I−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K is Hurwitz. This implies that each
eigenvalue of A¯−ρI−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K has a real part lesser than −ρ2 . We may identify a unique ϕ(0) = 0
such that ϕ(t) ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) and the resulting solution is ϕ = 0. By (3.13), we have
dx¯
dt
=
[
A¯−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K]x¯(t), x¯(0) = x¯0. (3.16)
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Since A¯− ρ2 I−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K is Hurwitz, then all the eigenvalues of A¯−B(R+DT PD)−1BT K have real
parts less than ρ2 . Hence, x¯ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn), and s = Kx¯ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn).
We now show the uniqueness. Suppose that (s′, x¯′) is another solution (in Cρ/2([0,∞),R2n)). Denoting ϕ ′ =
s′−Kx¯′, then ϕ ′ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) satisfies (3.15), which leads to ϕ ′ = 0. Subsequently, x¯′ satisfies (3.16). Hence,
x¯′ = x¯, which further implies s′ = s. 2
3.4 Asymptotic Nash equilibrium
We first present a lemma on the ρ-stability of the following system
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+ f (t)]dt+[Cx(t)+σ(t)]dW (t), t ≥ 0, (3.17)
where {W (t), t ≥ 0} is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion. A similar result was given in [29].
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the system [A,C] is ρ-stable, and E‖x(0)‖2 < ∞. Then, for any f ,σ ∈
Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x(t)‖2dt ≤ cE‖x(0)‖2+ cE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [‖ f (t)‖2+‖σ(t)‖2]dt < ∞.
Proof. Since [A,C] is ρ-stable, by the proof of i) of Lemma 3.1 and [9], there exists a matrix P > 0 such that
P(A− ρ
2
I)+(A− ρ
2
I)T P+CT PC =−M < 0.
Let V (t) = e−ρtxT (t)Px(t). By using Itoˆ’s formula, one has
EV (T )−EV (0) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[
xT (t)(−ρP+AT P+PA+CT PC)x(t)
+2(P f (t)+CT Pσ(t))T x(t)+σT (t)Pσ(t)
]
dt
= E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[− xT (t)Mx(t)+2(P f (t)+CT Pσ(t))T x(t)+σ(t)T Pσ(t)]dt
≤−c1E
∫ T
0
V (t)dt+E
∫ T
0
e−ρt [2(P f (t)+CT Pσ(t))T x(t)+λmax(P)‖σ(t)‖2]dt
≤−c1
2
E
∫ T
0
V (t)dt+ c2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(‖ f (t)‖2+‖σ(t)‖2)dt,
where
c1 =
λmin(M)
λmax(P)
, c2 > 0.
Here λmin(M) is the minimum eigenvalue of M and λmax(P) is the maximum eigenvalue of P. Then for any T > 0,
we obtain
E
∫ T
0
V (t)dt ≤ 2
c1
[
EV (0)−EV (T )+ c2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(‖ f (t)‖2+‖σ(t)‖2)dt
]
≤ 2
c1
[
λmax(P)E‖x(0)‖2+ c2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(‖ f (t)‖2+‖σ(t)‖2)dt
]
.
Letting T → ∞, this completes the proof. 2
After the strategy (3.11) is applied, the closed-loop dynamics for agent i may be written as follows:
dxˆi(t) = A¯ixˆi(t)dt−B(R+DT PiD)−1BT si(t)dt
+[C¯xˆi(t)−D(R+DT PiD)−1BT si(t)]dWi(t), 1≤ i≤ N.
Theorem 3.4. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then for Problem (P) and any N,
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2+‖uˆi(t)‖2)dt < ∞. (3.18)
7
Proof. From A5), there exists c0 > 0 such that E
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρt‖x¯(t)‖2dt ≤ c0. By Schwarz inequality,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖si(t)‖2dt = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥∥∥∫ ∞t e−(A¯i−ρI)(t−τ)x¯(τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥2 dt
=E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥∥∥∫ ∞t e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I+ A¯i2 − 3ρ4 I)(t−τ)x¯(τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥2 dt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∫ ∞
t
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dτ ·∫ ∞
t
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − 3ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2‖x¯(τ)‖2dτdt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
t
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dτ ·∫ ∞
t
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2e−ρτ‖x¯(τ)‖2dτdt. (3.19)
By Lemma 3.1, [A¯i,C¯i] is ρ-stable, which implies that all the eigenvalues of A¯i− ρ2 I have negative real parts. Thus,
there exist c > 0 and δ0 > 0 such that ‖e(
A¯i
2 − ρ4 I)t‖2 ≤ ce−δ0t . Note that E∫ ∞t e−δ0(τ−t)dτ = 1/δ0. By (3.19) and the
exchange of order of the integration, we obtain
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖si(t)‖2dt ≤E
∫ ∞
0
c
δ0
∫ ∞
t
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2e−ρτ‖x¯(τ)‖2dτdt
=
c
δ0
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖x¯(τ)‖2
∫ τ
0
∥∥e−( A¯i2 − ρ4 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ
≤ c
2
δ 20
E
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−δ0τ)e−ρτ‖x¯(τ)‖2dτ < ∞.
By Lemma 3.3 and A1),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)‖2dt ≤ cE‖xi(0)‖2+ cE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖si(t)‖2dt < ∞.
This together with (3.11) completes the proof. 2
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.4 shows that the closed-loop system is uniformly ρ-stable. Particularly, when ρ = 0,
one can obtain that the closed-loop states of all the agents are asymptotically stable in the mean square sense.
Define
ε2N =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥∥∥∫Θ x¯θ (t)dFN(θ)−
∫
Θ
x¯θ (t)dF(θ)
∥∥∥∥2 dt. (3.20)
Lemma 3.6. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥∥2 dt ≤ c( 1
N
+ ε2N),
where xˆ(N)(t) = 1N ∑
N
i=1 xˆi(t) and limN→∞ εN = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
We now show the set of decentralized strategies is an ε-Nash equilibrium, whose definition is copied from [1,
Chapter 4].
Definition 3.7. For a given ε ≥ 0, a set of strategies {ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is called an ε-Nash equilibrium with
respect to the set of cost functions {Ji,1≤ i≤ N} if for any i = 1, · · · ,N,
Ji(ui,u−i)≤ inf
ui∈Uc
Ji(ui,u−i)+ ε.
Theorem 3.8. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then for Problem (P), the set of strategies (uˆ1, · · · , uˆN) given by (3.11) is an
ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)− ε ≤ inf
ui∈Uc
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i), (3.21)
where ε = O(εN + 1√N ) and εN is given by (3.20).
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To prove Theorem 3.8, we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.9. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)≤J¯i(uˆi)+ ε, (3.22)
J¯i(uˆi)≤ inf
ui∈Uc
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)+ ε, (3.23)
where ε = O(εN + 1√N ).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. It follows from Lemma 3.9 that
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)≤ inf
ui∈Uc
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)+2ε,
which leads to the conclusion. 2
4 The integrator systems with multiplicative noise
In this section, we first consider the single-integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noise, and then extend
to the multiple-integrator systems.
4.1 The model of noisy single integrator
Now consider the degenerate case of (2.1), where xi,ui,Wi ∈R, A(θi) =C= 0 and B=D=Q= 1. In this situation,
the dynamics of agent i reduces to
dxi(t) = ui(t)dt+ui(t)dWi(t), i = 1, · · · ,N, (4.1)
The cost function of agent i is given by
Ji(ui,u−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∣∣xi(t)− x(N)(t)∣∣2+ r|ui(t)|2}dt, (4.2)
where ρ > 0 and r is allowed to negative.
Problem (P2). For (4.1)-(4.2), find an ε-Nash equilibrium inU ′1 ×U ′2 ×·· · ,U ′N to minimize {Ji, i= 1, · · · ,N},
where
U ′i =
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s),0≤ s≤ t),E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |ui(t)|2dt < ∞
}
.
We first give a preliminary result about the dynamics (4.1).
Lemma 4.1. For (4.1), there exists a constant c0 such that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtx2i (t)dt ≤ c0E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i (t)dt+ c0, i = 1, · · · ,N.
Proof. Denote xi,ρ(t) = e−
ρ
2 txi(t), and ui,ρ(t) = e−
ρ
2 tui(t). It follows from (4.1) that
dxi,ρ(t) =−ρ2 xi,ρ(t)dt+ui,ρ(t)dt+ui,ρ(t)dWi(t).
By Lemma 3.3, we obtain the conclusion of this lemma. 2
Replacing x(N) in (4.1) by x¯ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),R), we have the limiting optimal control problem.
Problem (P3). Find u¯i ∈U ′i such that
J¯i(u¯i) = inf
ui∈U ′i
(ui),
where
J¯i(ui) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∣∣xi(t)− x¯(t)∣∣2+ r|ui(t)|2}dt.
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Lemma 4.2. Let A1) hold and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . Suppose x¯ ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is given. For Problem (P3), the
following statements hold.
i) The algebraic Riccati equation
ρ p = 1− p
2
r+ p
(4.3)
admits a solution
p =
1−ρr+√∆
2(ρ+1)
(4.4)
such that p+ r > 0 and the system
dxi(t) =− pp+ r xi(t)dt−
p
p+ r
xi(t)dWi(t) (4.5)
is ρ-stable. Here ∆ := (ρr)2+2ρr+4r+1.
ii) The optimal control law is uniquely given by
u¯i(t) =− 1p+ r (pxi(t)+ s(t)), t ≥ 0,
where s ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is a unique solution to the equation
ds
dt
=
(
ρ+
p
p+ r
)
s(t)+ x¯(t). (4.6)
iii) The optimal cost is given by
inf
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui) = pE‖xi(0)‖2+2s(0)x¯0+g(0),
where g ∈Cρ([0,∞),R) is a unique solution to the equation
dg
dt
= ρg(t)+
s2(t)
p+ r
− x¯2(t). (4.7)
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
Remark 4.3. In Lemma 4.2, the condition r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 is to ensure the convexity of Problem (P3). Note
that the right hand is always negative for ρ > 0, which implies that this condition is satisfied necessarily if r > 0.
For Problem (P2), the consistency equations (3.8)-(3.10) reduce to
ds
dt
=
(
ρ+
p
p+ r
)
s(t)+ x¯(t), (4.8)
dx¯
dt
=− 1
p+ r
s(t)− p
p+ r
x¯(t). (4.9)
Proposition 4.4. Equations (4.8)-(4.9) have a unique bounded solution
(s(t), x¯(t))≡ (−px¯0, x¯0), t ≥ 0.
Proof. The equations (4.8)-(4.9) can be written as
d
dt
[
s
x¯
]
= H
[
s(t)
x¯(t)
]
, (4.10)
where
H =
[
ρ+ pp+r 1
− 1p+r − pp+r
]
.
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By some straightforward computations, we can diagonalize the matrix H via J = T−1HT , where
J =
[
0 0
0 ρ
]
, T =
[ −p p+ r
1 −p
]
.
The solution to (4.8)-(4.9) given by [
s(t)
x¯(t)
]
= eHt
[
s(0)
x¯(0)
]
is bounded if and only if (s(0), x¯(0))T lies in the characteristic subspace of the eigenvalue 0. This implies
(s(0), x¯(0))T = c0(−p,1)T , where c0 is a constant. Thus, we obtain that s(0) =−px¯0 and (4.8)-(4.9) has a unique
solution [
s(t)
x¯(t)
]
= eHt
[ −px¯0
x¯0
]
≡
[ −px¯0
x¯0
]
.
2
For a finite-population system in Problem (P2), we may construct the decentralized strategies as follows:
uˆi(t) =− pp+ r (xi(t)− x¯0), t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,N. (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) into (4.1), the closed-loop dynamics of agent i can be written as
dxˆi(t) =− pp+ r (xˆi(t)− x¯0)dt−
p
p+ r
(xˆi(t)− x¯0)dWi(t).
By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
xˆi(t) = x¯0+(xi(0)− x¯0)exp
[
− p
p+ r
t− p
2
2(p+ r)2
t− p
p+ r
Wi(t)
]
. (4.12)
Lemma 4.5. For Problem (P2), assume that A1) holds and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . Under the set of strategies
{uˆi, i = 1, · · · ,N} in (4.11), we have
lim
N→∞
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE|xˆ(N)(t)− x¯0|2dt = 0. (4.13)
Proof. It follows from (4.12) that
E
∣∣∣ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
xˆi(t)− x¯0
∣∣∣2 = E ∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑i=1(xi(0)− x¯0)exp
[
− p
p+ r
t− p
2
2(p+ r)2
t− p
p+ r
Wi(t)
]∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
N2
N
∑
i=1
E|xi(0)− x¯0|2Eexp
[
− 2p
p+ r
t− p
2
(p+ r)2
t− 2p
p+ r
Wi(t)
]
≤ 1
N
sup
1≤i≤N
E|xi(0)|2 exp
[(
− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
)
t
]
.
This gives ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE|xˆ(N)(t)− x¯0|2dt = 1N sup1≤i≤N
E|xi(0)|2
∫ ∞
0
exp
[(
−ρ− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
)
t
]
dt. (4.14)
By (4.3) and (4.4), we have
−ρ− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
=
1−ρr−2(ρ+1)p
p+ r
=−
√
∆
p+ r
, (4.15)
where
∆= (ρr)2+2ρr+4r+1.
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Note that
2
√
ρ+1− (ρ+2)
ρ2
=− 1
2
√
ρ+1+(ρ+2)
.
It can be verified that ∆> 0 when r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . By (4.4),
p+ r =
(ρ+2)r+1+
√
∆
2(ρ+1)
>
1− (ρ+2)2√ρ+1+ρ+2
2(ρ+1)
> 0.
From (4.14) and (4.15), we obtain (4.13). 2
Now we give the result of asymptotic optimality. Denote
U ′c =
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ σ(
N⋃
i=1
F it ),E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |ui(t)|2dt < ∞
}
.
Theorem 4.6. For Problem (P2), let A1) hold and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . Then the set of strategies (uˆ1, · · · , uˆN)
given by (4.11) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)− ε ≤ inf
ui∈U ′c
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i), (4.16)
where ε = O(εN + 1√N ). Furthermore, the asymptotic optimal cost of agent i is p(Ex
2
i (0)− x¯20).
To show Theorem 4.6, we first provide two lemmas, whose proofs are given in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.7. Assume that A1) holds and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . Then there exists δ > 0 and c > 0 such that
J¯i(ui)≥ δE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtui(t)dt− c.
Lemma 4.8. For Problem (P2), assume that A1) holds and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . For ui ∈Uc, if J(ui, uˆ−i) ≤ c1,
then there exist an integer N0 and a constant c2 such that for all N ≥ N0, E
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρtu2i (t)dt ≤ c2.
Remark 4.9. Lemma 4.7 shows under A1) and r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 , Problem (P3) is coercive. From this to-
gether with Lemma 4.2, Problem (P3) is convex and coercive. The properties ensure the existence and asymptotic
optimality of the decentralized strategies.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Note that infui∈Uc Ji(ui, uˆ−i) ≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i). It suffices to show the second inequality in
(4.16) by checking all ui such that
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)≤ c0. (4.17)
By Lemma 4.8, there exists an integer N0 and a constant c2 such that for all N ≥ N0,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i (t)dt ≤ c2,
which together with Lemma 4.1 gives
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtx2i (t)dt ≤ c.
Following an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.9, we can obtain the second inequality in (4.16). By
Lemma 4.2 and (4.3), the asymptotic optimal cost is given by
lim
N→∞
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i) = J¯i(uˆi) = E[px2i (0)+2s(0)xi(0)+g(0)] = p(Ex2i (0)− x¯20).
This completes the proof. 2
We now show under mild conditions all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
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Definition 4.10. In a multi-agent system, all the agents are said to reach the mean-square consensus if there
exists a random variable x∗ such that limt→∞E|xi(t)− x∗|2 = 0.
Theorem 4.11. For Problem (P2), assume that A1) holds and r > − 12(2+ρ) . Then there exist c1,c2 > 0 such
that under the set of strategies {uˆi, i = 1, · · · ,N} in (4.11),
E|xˆi(t)− x¯0|2 ≤ c1e−c2t , t > 0, 1≤ i≤ N, (4.18)
which imply all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
Proof. It follows from (4.12) that
E|xˆi(t)− x¯0|2 = E|xi(0)− x¯0|2Eexp
[
− 2p
p+ r
t− p
2
(p+ r)2
t− 2p
p+ r
Wi(t)
]
= E|xi(0)− x¯0|2 exp
[(
− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
)
t
]
≤ sup
1≤i≤N
E|xi(0)|2 exp
[
− p(p+2r)
(p+ r)2
t
]
. (4.19)
If r ≥ 0, then we directly have p > 0 and further obtain (4.18). For the case − 12(2+ρ) < r < 0, we first check the
sign of p+2r. By (4.4),
p+2r =
(3ρ+4)r+1+
√
(ρr+1)2+4r
2(ρ+1)
>
− ρ2(ρ+2) +
√
(1− ρ2(ρ+2) )2− 2ρ+2
2(ρ+1)
=
−ρ+ρ
4(ρ+1)(ρ+2)
= 0.
In view of − 12(2+ρ) < r < 0, it follows that p > p+ r > p+2r > 0. This together with (4.19) implies (4.18). By
A1) and the law of large numbers, we have limN→∞E| 1N ∑Ni=1 xˆi(0)− x¯0|2 = 0. 2
Remark 4.12. Note that 2(ρ+2)− (ρ+2+2√ρ+1) = (√ρ+1−1)2 > 0. Then we have
2
√
ρ+1− (ρ+2)
ρ2
=− 1
2
√
ρ+1+(ρ+2)
<− 1
2(2+ρ)
.
It means that r >− 12(2+ρ) implies r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . Thus, to achieve mean-square consensus for agents, a tighter
condition for r is needed.
4.2 The model of noisy multiple integrator
We now extend the above result to the high-dimensional case. Specifically, agent i evolves by
dxi = Buidt+DuidWi, i = 1, · · · ,N, (4.20)
and the cost function is given by
Ji(ui,u−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− x(N)(t)∥∥2+‖ui(t)‖2R}dt, (4.21)
where ρ ≥ 0 and R is symmetric.
For this problem, consistency equations (3.12)-(3.13) have the following solution.
Proposition 4.13. Equations (3.12)-(3.13) admit a unique bounded solution (s(t), x¯(t))≡ (−Px¯0, x¯0), t ≥ 0.
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Proof. Let Π = P+K, where P is the unique stabilizing solution to (3.3) (i.e., a solution such that A−
BR−1BT P− ρ2 I is Hurwitz) and K is the unique stabilizing solution to (3.14). Note that A = 0. We have that Π
satisfies
ρΠ+ΠB(R+DT PD)BTΠ= 0. (4.22)
From (3.16), A− ρ2 I−B(R+DT PD)−1BTΠ is Hurwitz. Thus, the solution to (4.22) is Π= 0. In view of the proof
of Theorem 3.2, we obtain x¯(t)≡ x¯0, and s(t)≡−Px¯0. 2
For a finite-population system in the above problem, we may construct the decentralized strategies as follows:
uˆi(t) =−(R+DT PD)−1BT P(xi(t)− x¯0), t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,N. (4.23)
Substituting (4.23) into (4.1), the closed-loop dynamics of agent i can be written as
dxˆi(t) =−B(R+DT PD)−1BT P(xˆi(t)− x¯0)dt−D(R+DT PD)−1BT P(xˆi(t)− x¯0)dWi(t). (4.24)
Theorem 4.14. The agents in (4.24) reach mean-square consensus if and only if [−B(R +
DT PD)−1BT P,−D(R+DT PD)−1BT P] is stable. Particularly, if R > 0 and ρ = 0, the agents achieve mean-square
consensus.
Proof. Note that (4.24) is equivalent to
d(xˆi(t)− x¯0) =−B(R+DT PD)−1BT P(xˆi(t)− x¯0)dt−D(R+DT PD)−1BT P(xˆi(t)− x¯0)dWi(t).
From Definition 4.10, we obtain that (4.24) reaches mean-square consensus if and only if [−B(R +
DT PD)−1BT P,−D(R + DT PD)−1BT P] is stable. If R > 0 and ρ = 0, then by Lemma 3.1, [−B(R +
DT PD)−1BT P,−D(R+DT PD)−1BT P] is stable. The theorem follows. 2
5 Numerical example
In this section, we give a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed consensus strategies for
multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. Furthermore, we compare the consensus effect between this case
and multi-agent systems with additive noises [25], [26].
First, consider a system of 50 agents with dynamics (2.1)-(2.2), where A(θi) = 0.1, C = 0.1, B = D = 1, r = 1
and ρ = 0.6. The initial states of the agents are taken independently from a normal distribution N(1, 0.5). After
the strategies in (16) are applied, the state trajectories of 50 agents are shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that all the
agents reach an agreement, but their states do not converge to a constant.
0 5 10 15
time
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
st
at
es
Figure 1: Under multiplicative noises 50 agents reach consensus (A = 0.1)
Next, consider a system of 50 agents with the single-integrator dynamics in (4.1)-(4.2), where D = 0.5, r = 1
and ρ = 0.6. The initial states of the agents are taken the same as above. Under strategies (4.11), the state
trajectories of the agents are shown in Figure 2. It is evident that the agents reach mean-square consensus.
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Figure 2: Under multiplicative noises 50 single-integrator agents reach consensus
For comparison, we simulate the single-integrator multi-agent system with additive noise. Specifically, the
dynamics of agent i is given by
dxi(t) = ui(t)dt+σdWi(t),
and the cost function is
Ji(ui,u−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∣∣xi(t)− x(N)(t)∣∣2+ r|ui(t)|2}dt.
The parameters r,ρ are taken the same as above and the noise intensity σ is 0.5. The control strategy is designed
by the mean field game methodology as in [25], [26]. The state trajectories of the single-integrator multi-agent
systems with additive noise are shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that the agents do not reach consensus, although
they behave similarly.
0 5 10 15
time
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
st
at
es
Figure 3: Under additive noises 50 single-integrator agents do not reach consensus
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, mean field games have been studied for multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. By solving an
auxiliary limiting optimal control problems subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized
strategies is obtained, which is shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. The result is further applied to the consensus
problem for the integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. It is shown that under mild conditions
the agents achieve asymptotic mean-square consensus. For further works, it is of interest to consider mean field
games for multi-agent systems with model uncertainty and common noises.
15
References
[1] T. Basar, G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, London: Academic Press. 1982.
[2] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, P. Yam, Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Theory, New York:
Springer. 2013.
[3] P. E. Caines, M. Huang, R. P. Malhame´, Mean field games, in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, T. Basar
and G. Zaccour Eds., Berlin: Springer. 2017; 1-28.
[4] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic analysis of mean-field games, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimiza-
tion. 2013; 51(4): 2705-2734.
[5] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic theory of mean field games with applications: I and II, Springer-Verlag.
2018.
[6] W. Fleming, R. Rishel, Deterministic and Stochastic Optimal Control, Springer. 1975.
[7] D. A. Gomes ,J. Saude, Mean field games models–a brief survey,Dynamic Games and Applications.
2014;4(2):110-154.
[8] O. Gue´ant, J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, Mean field games and applications. In Paris- Princeton Lectures on
Mathematical Finance, Springer-Verlag: Heidelberg, Germany. 2011;205-266.
[9] J. Huang, X. Li, J. Yong, A linear-quadratic optimal control problem for mean-field stochastic differential
equations in infinite horizon, Applied Mathematics & Optimization. 2015; 5(1): 97-139.
[10] M. Huang, Large-population LQG games involving a major player: The Nash certainty equivalence principle,
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2010;48(5): 3318-3353.
[11] M. Huang, P. E. Caines, R. P. Malhame´, Individual and mass behaviour in large population stochastic wireless
power control problems: Centralized and Nash equilibrium solutions, in: Proc. 54th IEEE Conference of
Decision and Control, Maui, HI. 2003;1:98-103.
[12] M. Huang, P. E. Caines, R. P. Malhame´, Large-population cost-coupled LQG problems with non-uniform
agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized ε-Nash equilibria, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Con-
trol. 2007;52(9): 1560-1571.
[13] M. Huang, R. P. Malhame´, P. E. Caines, Large population stochastic dynamic games: Closed-loop McKean-
Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle, Communications in Information and Systems.
2006;6(3): 221-251.
[14] M. Huang, J.H. Manton, Coordination and consensus of networked agents with noisy measurements: stochas-
tic algorithms and asymptotic behavior, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2009;48(1): 134-161.
[15] M. Huang, S. Nguyen, Mean field games for stochastic growth with relative utility. Applied Mathematics &
Optimization. 2016;74(3): 643-668.
[16] J. M. Lasry, P. L. Lions, Mean field games, Japanese Journal of Mathematics. 2007;2(1): 229-260.
[17] T. Li, J.-F. Zhang, Asymptotically optimal decentralized control for large population stochastic multiagent
systems, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2008;53(7): 1643-1660.
[18] T. Li, J.-F. Zhang, Mean square average consensus under measurement noises and fixed topologies: Necessary
and sufficient conditions, Automatica. 2009;45(8): 1929-1936.
[19] T. Li, F. Wu, J.-F. Zhang, Multi-agent consensus with relative-state-dependent measurement noises, IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control. 2014;59(9): 2463-2468.
16
[20] Z. Li, M. Fu, H. Zhang, Z. Wu, Mean field stochastic linear quadratic games for continuum-parameterized
multi-agent system, preprint, 2017.
[21] Y. Long, S. Liu, L. Xie, Distributed consensus of discrete-time multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises,
International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control. 2015;25(16): 3113-3131.
[22] B. P. Molinari, The time-invariant linear-quadratic optimal control problem, Automatica. 1977;13(4): 347-
357.
[23] Y.-H. Ni, X. Li, Consensus seeking in multi-agent systems with multiplicative measurement noises, Systems
& Control Letters. 2013;62(5): 430-437.
[24] Y.-H. Ni, J.-F. Zhang, X. Li, Indefinite mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control, IEEE Transac-
tions on Automatic Control. 2015;60(7): 1786-1800.
[25] M. Nourian, P. E. Caines, R. P. Malhame´, M. Huang, Nash, Social and centralized solutions to consensus
problems via mean field control theory, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2013;58(3): 639-653.
[26] M. Nourian, P. E. Caines, R. P. Malhame´, A mean field game synthesis of initial mean consensus problems:
A continuum approach for Non-Gaussian Behaviour, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2014;59(2):
449-455.
[27] G.D. Nunno, B. Øksendal, Advanced Mathematical Methods for Finance, Springer. 2011.
[28] M. Rami, X. Zhou, Linear matrix inequalities, Riccati equations, and indefinite stochastic linear quadratic
control, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2000;45(6): 1131-1142.
[29] J. Sun, J. Yong, S. Zhang, Linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games in an infinite
horizon, Esaim Control Optimisation & Calculus of Variations. 2016;22(3): 743-769.
[30] H. Tembine, Q. Zhu, T. Basar, Risk-sensitive mean-field games, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2014;59(4): 835-850.
[31] B. Wang, and M. Huang. Dynamic production output adjustment with sticky prices: A mean field game
approach. Proc. 54nd IEEE CDC, Osaka, Japan. 2015;4438-4443.
[32] B.-C. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Consensus conditions of multi-agent systems with unbalanced topology and
stochastic disturbances, Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences. 2009;29(10): 1353-1365.
[33] B.-C. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Distributed control of multi-agent systems with random parameters and a major
agent, Automatica. 2012; 48(9):2093-2106.
[34] B.-C. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Mean field games for large-population multiagent systems with Markov jump pa-
rameters, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2012;50(4): 2308-2334.
[35] B.-C. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Distributed output feedback control of Markov jump multi-agent systems, Automat-
ica. 2013;49(5):1397-1402.
[36] B.-C. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Hierarchical mean field games for multiagent systems with tracking-type costs:
Distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2014;59(8): 2241-2247.
[37] J. Wang, N. Elia, Mitigation of complex behavior over networked systems: Analysis of spatially invariant
structures, Automatica. 2013;49(6):1626-1638.
[38] G. Weintraub, C. Benkard, B. Van Roy, Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms, Econometrica.
2008;76(6): 1375-1411.
[39] J. Yong, X. Zhou, Stochastic Controls: Hamiltonian Systems and HJB Equations, New York: Springer. 1999.
17
[40] H. Zhang, J. Xu, Control for Itoˆ stochastic systems with input delay, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2017;62(1): 350-365.
[41] W. Zhang, H. Zhang, B. Chen, Generalized Lyapunov equation approach to state-dependent stochastic stabi-
lization/detectability criterion, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2008; 53(7):1630-1642.
[42] X. Zong, T. Li, G. Yin, L. Wang, J.-F. Zhang, Stochastic consentability of linear systems with time delays
and multiplicative noises, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2018; 63(4): 1059 - 1074.
[43] X. Zong, T. Li, J.-F. Zhang, Consensus conditions of continuous-time multi-agent systems with additive and
multiplicative measurement noises, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2018;56(1): 19-52.
A Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.6
Proof of Lemma 3.1. i) Let xi,ρ(t) = e−
ρ
2 txi(t), and ui,ρ(t) = e−
ρ
2 tui(t). From (2.1), we have
dxi,ρ(t) = [(Ai− ρ2 I)xi,ρ(t)+Bui,ρ ](t)dt+[Cxi,ρ(t)+Dui,ρ(t)]dWi(t). (A.1)
By A4) and [41], the equation (3.3) admits a unique semi-positive definite solution, and under the control
u¯i,ρ(t) =−(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi,ρ(t), t ≥ 0,
the solution of closed-loop system satisfies E
∫ ∞
0 ‖xi,ρ(t)‖2dt < ∞. Then, part i) follows.
ii) Letting yi,ρ(t) = E[xi,ρ(t)], we have from (A.1)
dyi,ρ(t) = (Ai− ρ2 I)yi,ρ(t)dt+Bui,ρ(t)dt.
Under the control u¯i,ρ =−(R+DT PiD)−1(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi,ρ , it holds that∫ ∞
0
‖yi,ρ(t)‖2dt =
∫ ∞
0
‖Exi,ρ(t)‖2dt ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
‖xi,ρ(t)‖2dt < ∞.
This implies that the real part of any eigenvalue of A¯i− (ρ/2)I is negative. It follows from (3.4) that
si(t) = e−(A¯i−ρI)
T t
[
si(0)+
∫ t
0
e(A¯i−ρI)
T τQx¯(τ)dτ
]
.
From an argument in [34, Appendix A], we have that s ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) if and only if the initial state s(0) has the
following expression si(0) =−
∫ ∞
0 e
(A¯i−ρI)T τQx¯(τ)dτ. Under this initial condition, we have
si(t) =−
∫ ∞
t
e−(A¯i−ρI)
T (t−τ)Qx¯(τ)dτ. (A.2)
Furthermore, using a similar argument as the above, we have gi ∈Cρ([0,∞),R2) if and only if
gi(0) =−
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [sTi (t)B(R+D
T PiD)−1BT si(t)− x¯T (t)Qx¯(t)]dt.
iii) Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−ρt [xTi (t)Pixi(t)+2sTi (t)xi(t)+gi(t)], we have
J¯i(ui) = E[xTi (0)Pixi(0)+2sTi (0)xi(0)+gi(0)]− limT→∞E
[
e−ρT (xTi (T )Pixi(T )+2s
T
i (T )xi(T )+gi(T ))
]
+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥ui(t)+(R+DT PiD)−1[(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi(t)+BT si(t)]∥∥2R+DT PiDdt
= E[xTi (0)Pixi(0)+2sTi (0)xi(0)+gi(0)]
+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥ui(t)+(R+DT PiD)−1[(BT Pi+DT PiC)xi(t)+BT si(t)]∥∥2R+DT PiDdt
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≥ E[xTi (0)Pixi(0)+2sTi (0)xi(0)+gi(0)]. (A.3)
Thus, (3.7) is the optimal control and the optimal value is
J¯i(u¯i) = inf
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui) = E[xTi (0)Pixi(0)+2sTi (0)xi(0)+gi(0)].
This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Note that {xˆi(t)− x¯i(t), t ≥ 0}, i = 1, ...,N, are mutually independent processes with zero
mean, where x¯i(t)
∆
= Exi(t) = x¯θi(t). We have
E‖xˆ(N)− x¯‖2 =E
∥∥∥ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
(xˆi− x¯i)+ 1N
N
∑
i=1
(x¯i− x¯)
∥∥∥2
=
1
N2
N
∑
i=1
E‖xˆi− x¯i‖2+
∥∥∥ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
x¯i− x¯
∥∥∥2.
Note that xˆi− x¯i satisfies
d(xˆi− x¯i) = A¯i(xˆi− x¯i)dt+C¯xˆidWi.
It follows from Theorem 3.4 that
1
N2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
N
∑
i=1
‖xˆi− x¯i‖2dt
≤ 1
N
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥e(A¯i− ρ2 I)t(xi0− x¯0)∥∥2dt+ 1N max1≤i≤NE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥∥∫ t
0
eA¯i(t−τ)xˆi(τ)dWi(τ)
∥∥∥2dt
≤ 1
N
∫ ∞
0
∥∥e(A¯i− ρ2 I)t∥∥2 max
1≤i≤N
E‖xi0− x¯0)‖2dt+ 1N max1≤i≤NE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∫ t
0
∥∥eA¯i(t−τ)∥∥2‖xˆi(τ)‖2dτdt
≤c1
N
+
1
N
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖xˆi(τ)‖2
∫ ∞
τ
∥∥e(A¯i− ρ2 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ ≤ c2
N
.
(A.4)
By A3), we have ∥∥∥∥∥ 1N N∑i=1 x¯i− x¯
∥∥∥∥∥=
∥∥∥∥∫Θ x¯θdFN(θ)−
∫
Θ
x¯θdF(θ)
∥∥∥∥ ∆= hN(t).
By the weak convergence in A2), limN→∞ hN(t) = 0 for each t, which further implies
lim
N→∞
ε2N = limN→∞
∫ ∞
0
e−ρthN(t)dt = 0.
Recalling (A.4), the lemma follows. 2
B Proofs of Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 4.2
Proof of Lemma 3.9. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 3.6, we have
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xˆi(t)− x¯(t)+ x¯(t)− xˆ(N)(t)∥∥2Q+‖uˆi(t)‖2R}dt
≤ J¯i(uˆi)+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥x¯− xˆ(N)∥∥2Qdt+2c(E∫ ∞0 e−ρt∥∥x¯− xˆ(N)∥∥2Qdt
)1/2
≤ J¯i(uˆi)+ ε.
Note that infui∈Uc Ji(ui, uˆ−i)≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i). It suffices to show (3.23) by checking all ui such that
Ji(ui, uˆ−i)≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)≤ c0. (B.1)
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It follows by Theorem 3.4 that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi− 1N xi∥∥2Qdt ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi− 1N xi− 1N ∑j 6=i xˆ j
∥∥2
Qdt+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥ 1
N ∑j 6=i
xˆ j
∥∥2
Qdt
≤ c0+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
N−1∑j 6=i
∥∥xˆ j∥∥2Qdt ≤ c,
which implies
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi‖2Qdt ≤ c1, (B.2)
where c1 is independent of N. By direct calculation, we have
Ji(ui, uˆ−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi− x¯+ x¯− 1N xi− 1N ∑j 6=i xˆ j
∥∥2
Q+‖uˆi‖2R
}
dt
≥ J¯i(ui)+2E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(xi− x¯)T Q
(
x¯− 1
N
xi− 1N ∑j 6=i
xˆ j
)
dt
∆
= J¯i(ui)+2I1. (B.3)
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (B.2),
I21 ≤E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
2‖xi‖2Q+‖x¯‖2Q
)
dtE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
2
∥∥ 1
N
x¯− 1
N
xi
∥∥2
Q+2
∥∥x¯− xˆ(N)∥∥2Q)
≤c( c
N2
+2ε2).
From this together with (B.3), we get (3.23). 2
Proof of Lemma 4.2. i) By solving (4.3), we obtain
p =
1−ρr±√∆
2(ρ+1)
,
where ∆= (ρr)2+2ρr+4r+1. Choose the maximal solution [28]
p =
1−ρr+√∆
2(ρ+1)
. (B.4)
Note that
2
√
ρ+1− (ρ+2)
ρ2
=− 1
2
√
ρ+1+(ρ+2)
<− 1
ρ
.
It can be verified that ∆> 0 when r > 2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)
ρ2 . By (B.4),
p+ r >
(ρ+2)[2
√
ρ+1−(ρ+2)]
ρ2 +1
2(ρ+1)
=
1− (ρ+2)2√ρ+1+ρ+2
2(ρ+1)
> 0.
It follows by (4.5) that
dxi
xi
=− p
p+ r
dt− p
p+ r
dWi(t).
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to lnxi and using the above equation, we have
d(lnxi) =
dxi
xi
− p
2
2(p+ r)2
dt
=−
[ p
p+ r
+
p2
2(p+ r)2
]
dt− p
p+ r
dWi(t),
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which implies
xi(t) = xi(0)exp
[
− p
p+ r
t− p
2
2(p+ r)2
t− p
p+ r
Wi(t)
]
.
This follows a geometric Brownian motion. By A1) and the direct calculation,
E|xi(t)|2 = E|xi(0)|2 exp
[(
− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
)
t
]
,
which gives ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE|xi(t)|2dt = E|xi(0)|2
∫ ∞
0
exp
[(
−ρ− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
)
t
]
dt.
By (4.3) and (B.4),
−ρ− 2p
p+ r
+
p2
(p+ r)2
=
1−ρr−2(ρ+1)p
p+ r
=−
√
∆
p+ r
< 0.
Thus,
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρtE|xi(t)|2dt < ∞, i.e., (4.5) is ρ-stable.
ii)-iii) It follows from (4.6) that
s(t) = e(ρ+
p
p+r )t
[
s(0)+
∫ t
0
e−(ρ+
p
p+r )τ x¯dτ
]
.
Since p+ r > 0, it is straightforward to show that s ∈Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) if and only if s(0) = −
∫ ∞
0 e
−(ρ+ pp+r )τ x¯dτ,
which implies
s(t) =−
∫ ∞
t
e
(
ρ+ pp+r
)
(t−τ)x¯dτ.
By a similar argument, we have g ∈Cρ([0,∞),Rn) if and only if
g(0) =−
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ
[ s2
p+ r
− x¯2]dτ.
By Lemma 4.1, for any ui ∈U ′i , E
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρtx2i dt < ∞. Applying Itoˆ’s formula into e−ρt(px2i +2sxi+g), we have
J¯i(ui) =E[px2i (0)+2s(0)xi(0)+g(0)]
+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(p+ r)
[
ui+
p
p+ r
(xi− x¯)
]2
dt
≥E[px2i (0)+2s(0)xi(0)+g(0)]. (B.5)
Thus, if and only if ui = u¯i =− pp+r (xi− x¯), then
J¯i(u¯i) = inf
ui∈U ′i
J¯i(ui) = E[px2i (0)+2s(0)xi(0)+g(0)].
This completes the proof. 2
C Proofs of Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8
Proof of Lemma 4.7. From (4.7) and Proposition 4.4, it follows that g satisfies
dg
dt
= ρg−ρ px¯20.
We can identify this equation admits a unique solution g(t) ≡ px¯20 in Cρ([0,∞),R). By Lemma 4.7,
E
∫ ∞
0 e
−ρtx2i (t)dt ≤ c. By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
J¯i(ui) =E[px2i (0)+2s(0)xi(0)+g(0)]− limT→∞E
[
e−ρT (px2i (T )+2s(T )xi(T )+g(T ))
]
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+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(p+ r)
[
ui+
p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)
]2
dt
=E[px2i (0)]− px¯20+E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(p+ r)
[
ui+
p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)
]2
dt. (C.1)
Let u∗i = ui+
p
p+r (xi− x¯0). Then by (4.1), xi satisfies
dxi =
[− p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)+u∗i
]
dt+
[− p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)+u∗i
]
dWi.
By Lemma 3.3, there exists a constant c > 0,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |xi|2dt ≤ c0E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |u∗i |2dt+ c0.
Thus,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |ui|2dt =E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [u∗i −
p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)]2dt
≤cE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt |u∗i |2dt+ c
=cE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
ui+
p
p+ r
(xi− x¯0)
]2dt+ c.
Note that p+ r > 0. From (C.1), the lemma follows. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.8. For ui ∈Uc, we have
c1 ≥J(ui, uˆ−i)
=E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{[
xi− 1N
(
xi+
N
∑
j 6=i
xˆ j
)]2
+ ru2i
}
dt
=E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{[
xi− x¯+ x¯− 1N
(
xi+
N
∑
j 6=i
xˆ j
)]2
+ ru2i
}
dt
≥J¯(ui)+2E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(xi− x¯)
[
x¯− 1
N
(
xi+
N
∑
j 6=i
xˆ j
)]
dt
≥J¯(ui)−2I2, (C.2)
where
I2
∆
= 2
{
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(xi− x¯)2dt ·E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
x¯− xˆ(N)− 1
N
(xi− xˆi)
]2
dt
} 1
2
.
Notice that x¯≡ x¯0. By Lemma 4.1, we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(xi− x¯)2dt ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(2x2i +2x¯
2)dt
≤ cE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i dt+ c.
(C.3)
It follows from Theorems 4.5 and 3.4 that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
x¯− xˆ(N)− 1
N
(xi− xˆi)
]2
dt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
2(x¯− xˆ(N))2+ 2
N2
(xi− xˆi)2
]
dt
≤ c
N
+
c
N2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i dt,
which together with (C.2) implies
|I2| ≤ cNE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i dt+
c√
N
.
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By (C.2) and Lemma 4.7, we obtain
c1 ≥ J(ui, uˆ−i)≥ (δ − cN )E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i dt−2c.
Letting N0 = inf{m ∈ Z|m > c/δ}, we obtain that there exists a constant c2 such that for all N > N0,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu2i (t)dt ≤
N(c1+2c)
Nδ − c
∆
= c2.
This completes the proof. 2
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